

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 LA PAZ 0533

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MPOL, MASS, MORG, PGOV  
SUBJECT: US-LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS

REF: 77 STATE 306726

EMBASSY LA PAZ VIEWS ON QUESTIONS POSED IN REFERENCE FOLLOW.  
RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPHS OF REFERENCE.

2.A. THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS THE MAINTENANCE OF CLOSE AND  
CONSTRUCTIVE TIES BETWEEN THE USG AND THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY  
AS CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVING US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN BOLIVIA,  
ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC  
GOVERNMENT AND THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY HAVE BEEN THE DOMINANT POLITICAL  
FACTOR IN BOLIVIA FOR THE PAST 13 YEARS. THEY WILL BE THE  
DECIDING ELEMENT AS THE NATION BEGINS THE TRANSITION TO A  
CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT DURING 1978 (A  
TRANSITION PUBLICLY ENCOURAGED BY THE USG) AND WILL CONTINUE  
TO PLAY A TUTELARY ROLE IN BOLIVIAN POLITICS FOR THE  
FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE MILITARY'S WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN AND  
FOSTER THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, AND AFTERWARDS TO  
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SUPPORT SUCH GOVERNMENTS, WILL DETERMINE IN LARGE MEASURE  
WHETHER DEMOCRACY CAN SUCCEED IN BOLIVIA. THE MANY YEARS OF  
MILITARY POLITICAL DOMINANCE (ESPECIALLY THE PAST THREE YEARS  
OF AN ALL MILITARY GOVERNMENT) HAVE LEFT CIVILIAN POLITICAL  
INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING POLITICAL PARTIES, EXTREMELY WEAK AND  
DISORGANIZED. LEGISLATIVE BODIES HAVE NOT EXISTED FOR SIX  
YEARS. BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTIONS MANY PROBLEMS WILL OCCUR,

INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENCE, STRIKES AND DISORDER. THE MILITARY WILL NOT ONLY HAVE TO PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE DURING THIS PERIOD, BUT IF SIGNIFICANT VIOLENCE OR INSTABILITY DOES OCCUR, SOME WILL CALL FOR A RETURN TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

ASSUMING THAT AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT TAKES OFFICE IN AUGUST 1978, THE MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A PRINCIPAL POLICY ROLE AND PERHAPS ALSO TO PROVIDE SOME PERSONNEL FOR SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND WILL PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNMENT CABINET MEETINGS AND DECISIONS. OVER TIME, AS CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS STRENGTHEN, WE EXPECT THE MILITARY TO WITHDRAW TO AN INCREASINGLY CONTINGENT, RATHER THAN ACTIVE, POLITICAL ROLE. EVEN THEN, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT IN MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY; AND IN PROMOTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CIVIC ACTION AND OTHER NATION BUILDING ROLES.

BOLIVIA'S CENTRAL GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND ITS POSITION AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF TIN, TUNGSTEN AND OTHER STRATEGIC MINERALS AND HYDROCARBONS ARE ALSO STRONG REASONS TO ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A CONGRUENCE BETWEEN BOLIVIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND US INTERESTS AND SECURITY NEEDS.

OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP IS ONE OF THE BEST POLICY INSTRUMENTS WE HAVE TO MAINTAIN THE ACCESS AND PRESTIGE WE NEED TO INFLUENCE THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY IN THE DIRECTION OF US POLICY  
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GOALS. THIS OCCURS IN TWO WAYS:

A. THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY HAVE GREAT RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER AND THEY LOOK TO US FOR LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE. THEY ALSO ADMIRE THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE OF THE US MILITARY AND ARE WELL AWARE OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN US SOCIETY. BOLIVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS BELIEVE THEY HAVE PLAYED A POSITIVE AND RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN RESTORING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STABILITY TO BOLIVIA AFTER DECADES OF INSTABILITY. CONTINUING A SIGNIFICANT SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH BY PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY AS A SYMBOL THAT THE USG BELIEVES THEY HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN RETURNING BOLIVIA TO A SUCCESSFUL AND DURABLE DEMOCRACY. THEY ARE MORE LIKELY, THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE REDUCE OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP TO THE POINT THAT IT REFLECTS INDIFFERENCE OR LACK OF INTEREST IN BOLIVIA'S MILITARY AND WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE, THEY WILL BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CLEAR USG INTERESTS SUCH AS RETURN TO DEMOCRACY, IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS, AND COCA PRODUCTION CONTROL.

B. ON THE PERSONAL LEVEL, THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE

RELATIONSHIP PROVIDES ACCESS, INFLUENCE, EDUCATION AND TRAINING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL TIES WITH IMPORTANT MILITARY OFFICERS. MANY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT LEADERS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT BANZER, HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY CLOSE IN PAST YEARS TO MILGP AND DAO PERSONNEL AND MANY HAVE STUDIED OR SERVED IN THE US. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND OTHER KEY US EMBASSY OFFICIAL'S EASE OF ACCESS TO BOLIVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO OCCUPY CABINET AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS IS ENHANCED AND CONDITIONED TO A GREAT DEGREE BY THEIR PAST CLOSE CONTACTS WITH US MILITARY OFFICERS AND ATTENDANCE AT US MILITARY SCHOOLS IN THE CANAL ZONE AND THE US. SIMILARLY, FUTURE US TIES WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY WILL BE INFLUENCED BY PRESENT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS.

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IN THE PAST, MUCH OF THE US-GOB MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WAS BASED ON MATERIAL PROVIDED THROUGH THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. WITH THE RAPID DECLINE OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND INCREASING THIRD COUNTRY ACTIVITY (THE ARGENTINE MILITARY PRESENCE IN PARTICULAR HAS BECOME MORE EVIDENT), THE ABILITY OF THE US TO INFLUENCE THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY HAS DIMINISHED. HOWEVER, THE BOLIVIANS STILL JUDGE THE US TO BE THE BEST SOURCE OF MILITARY KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION. CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE, AND THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE TRAINING AT WHAT THE BOLIVIANS CONSIDER THE WORLD'S BEST MILITARY SCHOOLS ARE

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ADVANTAGES WE MUST PRESS.

2.B. OVERALL USG RELATIONS WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY ARE GOOD. WHILE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE US MILITARY (MILGP, DAO, IAGS) AND THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY REMAIN STRONG, THE CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL TIES OF THE PAST ARE WEAKENING AS TANGIBLE US MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES DECREASE. THE TIES AND INFLUENCE OF TODAY HAVE THEIR GENESIS IN THE ACTIONS OF THE PAST. IN THE SAME VEIN, WHAT WE DO NOW WILL SHAPE THE TIES AND DETERMINE THE INFLUENCE OF THE FUTURE.

THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY (AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES), IN ADDITION TO ITS ACKNOWLEDGED AND TRADITIONAL ROLE AS GUARDIAN OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, IS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION. HENCE, USG RELATIONS WITH BOLIVIAN MILITARY ARE AFFECTED BY ALL USG POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS OCCUPYING GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS ARE COGNIZANT OF AND SENSITIVE TO THE FULL RANGE OF US ACTIVITIES (ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY); WHEREAS THE OFFICERS SERVING IN MILITARY POSITIONS ARE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED

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WITH EQUIPPING AND TRAINING THEIR UNITS TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, INTERNAL SECURITY AND CIVIC ACTION. WHILE THESE TWO GROUP HAVE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES BECAUSE OF THE SCOPE AND THRUST OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT COMMONALITY, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE SENIOR OFFICERS OF BOTH GROUPS, BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY OF THEIR PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUNDS AND THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH THEY MOVE BETWEEN MILITARY AND GOVERNMENTAL ASSIGNMENTS. TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, THE ACTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS APPOINTED TO GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS HAVE BEEN SHAPED BY THE TRAINING AND EXPERIENCES OF THEIR MILITARY CAREERS.

THE FIRST GROUP (MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT ) PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON USG SUPPORT OF PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, E.G. US SUPPORT FOR A CORRIDOR TO THE SEA, US SUPPORT FOR LOANS TO BOLIVIA IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, UNDERSTANDING OF GOB POSITIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL TIN COUNCIL, CONTINUED USAID PROJECTS, AND PROTECTION OF BOLIVIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND NEUTRALITY IN THE EVENT OF A PERU-CHILE WAR. THEY NEED WHAT WE CAN GIVE--ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. MOREOVER, THESE ARE SENIOR OFFICERS WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF THE US HAVE BEEN CONDITIONED AND TEMPERED BY THE RELATIVELY LARGE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OF THE PAST, RATHER

THAN BY THE MUCH REDUCED PROGRAM OF TODAY.

THE SECOND GROUP (MILITARY IN MILITARY POSITIONS), WHILE RESPECTFUL OF PAST US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, IS MORE CONCERNED WITH THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE. THEIR UNITS ARE POORLY EQUIPPED, SUPPLIED AND MAINTAINED. THEY NEED WHAT WE CANNOT NOW PROVIDE-- MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. THEIR ORIENTATION IS MOVING FROM THE US TO THIRD COUNTRIES. YET, THESE ARE PRECISELY THE OFFICERS WHO WILL FILL KEY LEADERSHIP ROLES IN THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES AND GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE.  
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AS CAN BE DEDUCED FROM THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, THE GOB (WHETHER DOMINATED OR INTEGRATED BY MILITARY OFFICERS) ASSIGNS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIGN A HIGH DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH USG. THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY, IN ITS CURRENT ROLE AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, CURRENTLY SHARES THIS VIEW. ITS OFFICERS VALUE THE CLOSE TIES AND FRIENDSHIP ESTABLISHED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE US MILITARY WHOM THEY HAVE MET IN BOLIVIA AND THE US; THEY ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THE SUPPORT WE HAVE PROVIDED IN THE PAST; THEY RESPECT AND ADMIRE THE EFFICIENCY, TECHNOLOGY, AND POWER OF THE US ARMED FORCES; BUT THEY ARE PERPLEXED (SOMETIMES VEXED) THAT WE ARE NO LONGER PROVIDING THEM EVEN OUTDATED EQUIPMENT TO MEET WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE BONAFIDE NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

AS THE MILITARY WITHDRAWS FROM THE PUBLIC SCENE (EVEN THOUGH RETAINING MUCH INFLUENCE AND CONTROL), THEIR ORIENTATION WILL BE DETERMINED AND INFLUENCED BY MILITARY, RATHER THAN BY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE WILL BECOME MORE FUNDAMENTAL IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE STILL POLITICALLY POTENT BOLIVIAN MILITARY. IF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOLLOWS THE CURRENT DOWNWARD TREND, THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO TURN TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THEY NOW ATTACH TO MILITARY TIES WITH US WILL DECREASE.

2.C. IN ADDITION TO RESPONDING TO THE STATED QUESTION, WE HAVE CHOSEN, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR INTERESTS, TO SEPARATELY ADDRESS ACTIONS WHICH ALTHOUGH BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF CURRENT US POLICY WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE OUR TIES WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY IN THE MID AND LONG-TERM.

(1) WITHIN CURRENT US POLICY, WE SHOULD ACT TO:  
(A) SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY  
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EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) FUNDS AVAILABLE TO BOLIVIA. SUCH AN INCREASE WOULD OFFSET CONSTANTLY RISING COURSE COSTS; PROVIDE FOR A REAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING US MILITARY SCHOOLS IN THE CANAL ZONE AND, ESPECIALLY, IN THE US; INCREASE THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS TO VISIT THE COUNTRY; AND PERMIT THE PROGRAMMING OF FUNDS TO PROCURE MILITARY PUBLICATIONS AND TRAINING AIDS.

(B) CONTINUE TO OFFER FMS FINANCING AT APPROXIMATELY FY 1977 (\$12 MILLION) AND FY 1978 (\$14 MILLION ) LEVELS. SOFTEN TERMS (INTEREST RATES AND PAYBACK PERIOD) TO THE LEGAL MINIMUM FOR MATERIAL DESTINED TO SUPPORT THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY'S NATION BUILDING ROLE. SUCH ACTION WOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT GOB WOULD USE THE CREDITS; HENCE ENCOURAGING THE MILITARY'S CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM, WHILE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE THE CONSTRUCTIVE ACCESS TO THE MILITARY WHICH WE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN. AUTHORIZE USE OF FMS FINANCING FOR PRUCHASE OF SPARE PARTS AND MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES FOR MAP EQUIPEMENT PRESENTLY IN USE. WE ARE AWARE OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT FMS FINANCING FOR

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THE MILITARY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES CAN INCREASE THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN SOCIETY AND THEREFORE RUN COUNTER TO THE US OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THIS HYPOTHESIS, WHILE IT MAY APPLY TO A COUNTRY WITH A GROWING MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH AGRESSIVELY

DISPLACES PRIVATE ACTIVITY, DOES NOT APPLY TO BOLIVIA. THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES -- 21,000 MEN -- ARE NOT GROWING. BOLIVIA IS, BY CHOICE, A COUNTRY WITH A LARGELY PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMY OUTSIDE OF AGRICULTURE WHERE THE MILITARY PLAY LITTLE ROLE). WITHIN THAT SECTOR THE MILITARY HAVE LONG CONSTITUTED ONE OF THE BEST TRAINED AND ORGANIZED ELEMENTS FOR SOME TYPES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES (E.G. COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION, SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, HOSPITALS, ROAD BUILDING). THEY WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THESE ACTIVITIES NOT MATTER WHAT WE DO. A MODEST AMOUNT OF FMS FINANCING FOR SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT USED IN THESE ACTIVITIES MAY INCREASE THEIR EFFICIENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, BUT IT IS NOT STRATEGICALLY GOING TO EXPAND THE AREA OF THE MILITARY'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES. CONCEIVABLY THE MILITARY COULD AT SOME FUTURE POINT UNWISELY SEEK TO ENTER AN AREA WHERE PREEMPTION OF PRIVATE ACTIVITY WERE POSSIBLE BUT WE DOUBT THEY WOULD WASTE THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS WAY, AND IF THEY DID WE SHOULD CERTAINLY DECLINE TO PROVIDE THE FINANCING.

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(C) ACCEPT AND APPROVE NOMINATIONS OF MILITARY OFFICERS SERVING IN MILITARY POSITIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IVP PROGRAM.

(D) CONTINUE IAGS PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA.

(E) PROVIDE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR BOLIVIAN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS, E.G. CORRIDOR TO THE SEA, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, RECOGNITION OF ROLE OF MILITARY IN NATION BUILDING.

(F) NEITHER TAKE NOR RECOMMEND ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSTRUED BY THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TO SIGNAL A FURTHER WANING OF US INTEREST IN BOLIVIA.

(G) EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSIGNING HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND MOTIVATED PERSONNEL TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ASSIGNING COMBAT ARMS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS TO SUCH POSITIONS.

(2) SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ABOVE, ACTION SHOULD BE INITIATED TO ALTER PRESENT POLICY TO PROVIDE FOR THE FOLLOWING:

(A) OFFER MORE FAVORABLE INTEREST RATES FOR FMS FINANCING WHEN SUCH FUNDS ARE USED TO PURCHASE EQUIPMENT SUPPORTIVE OF NATION BUILDING. THIS ACTION WOULD REINFORCE THAT SUGGESTED IN PARA 2C(1)(B) ABOVE.

(B) REINSTITUTE MAP TO (1) AUGMENT PRIOR YEAR FUNDING LEVELS IN ORDER TO OFFSET INCREASED UNIT COSTS WHICH HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED DELIVERED QUANTITIES OF ORIGINALLY

PROGRAMMED EQUIPMENT, AND (2) PROVIDE FUNDS ON A REDUCED SCALE FOR PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT NATION BUILDING PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE THE LIFESTYLE OF BOLIVIAN  
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ENLISTED PERSONNEL, E.G., CONSTRUCTION OF BARRACKS AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES, INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. 2.D. AS DISCUSSED IN PARA 2B, ABOVE, BECAUSE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES, THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES NOW HAVE A BROAD ORIENTATION WHICH POINTS UP TO THEM THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT AS WELL AS FOR MILITARY SUPPORT. HENCE, US SUPPORT IN ANY OF THESE AREAS IS CURRENTLY IMPORTANT TO TIES BETWEEN THE USG AND THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY. AS THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY RELINQUISHES CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS TO A CIVILIAN DOMINATED GOVERNMENT, MILITARY COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE WILL NATURALLY ASSUME GREATER RELATIVE IMPORTANCE FOR THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY.

IN THAT ENVIRONMENT AND ABSENT ARMS TRANSFERS (THE PRINCIPAL AND TRADITIONAL INCENTIVE FOR TIES WITH THE USG), THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY WILL BE MOTIVATED TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH THE US TO (1) PROVIDE A FORUM IN WHICH TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR BROAD MILITARY INTERESTS (E.G., CORRIDOR TO THE SEA, REGIONAL STABILITY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND NARCOTICS CONTROL); (2) SEEK INCREASED ASSISTANCE IN THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED MAP EQUIPMENT; (3) PRESERVE ACCESS TO US MILITARY SCHOOLS AS A SOURCE OF PROFESSIONAL LEVEL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING; AND (4) MAINTAIN EASY ACCESS TO THE US COMMERCIAL MARKET AS A SOURCE OF NON-MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPORTIVE OF NATION BUILDING AND CIVIC ACTION ROLES.

THE US CAN ONLY PARTIALLY SERVE ITS OWN AND BOLIVIAN MILITARY INTERESTS BY PROVIDING SUPPORT AND ADVICE OF THE TYPE OUTLINED IN PART TWO OF THE ABOVE QUESTION. HOWEVER, SUCH ACTIVITY SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD IMPROVING THE BOLIVIAN CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE MAP EQUIPMENT IN THE BOLIVIAN INVENTORY. (PROVIDING ADVICE AND SUPPORT RELATIVE TO EQUIPMENT PURCHASED FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD PAY LITTLE DIVIDENDS OTHER THAN AS A MEANS TO MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF BOLIVIAN INTENTIONS AND ACTIONS, OR TO ATTEMPT  
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TO INFLUENCE BOLIVIAN DECISIONS AS TO WHICH COUNTRIES THEY DO BUSINESS WITH).

HOWEVER, THESE ADVISORY ACTIONS WILL NOT "SUFFICIENTLY" SERVE GOB INTERESTS; HENCE, WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE "SUFFICIENT" TO ACHIEVE OUR INTERESTS IN THAT THEY WILL BE INADEQUATE TO ENABLE US TO MAINTAIN THE TIES WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY THAT HAVE FACILITATED THE ACHIEVEMENT AND PRESERVATION OF US INTERESTS IN BOLIVIA IN RECENT YEARS.

THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES EITHER THROUGH MAP OR FMS FINANCING (ASSUMING MORE FAVORABLE TERMS

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CAN BE OFFERED) WILL CONTINUE TO PREPRESENT THE KEY MOTIVATOR FOR THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH THE US. OF LESSER, BUT STILL SIGNIFICANT, IMPORTANCE WOULD BE THE PROVISION OF FUNDS OR MATERIAL SUPPORTIVE OF THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY'S NATIONAL BUILDING ROLE.

2.E. THESE PROGRAMS CAN PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN SERVING BROAD US INTERESTS. WHILE OF SOME VALUE IN THE SHORT TERM, THEIR PRINCIPAL PAYOFF IS REALIZED IN THE MID AND LONG-TERM. HOWEVER, THEY MUST BE FINANCED AND STIMULATED NOW.

BOLIVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT THE US. THOSE WHO HAVE ATTENDED US MILITARY SCHOOLS, OR HAVE OTHERWISE VISITED THE US, ARE VERY PROUD OF THE FACT AND SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT THEIR EXPERIENCES. THEY ARE NORMALLY MORE OPEN, ACCESSIBLE AND PRONE TO ACCEPT US POLICIES WITHOUT HARSH CRITICISM. ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, THE OFFICERS WHO HAVE ATTENDED US MILITARY SCHOOLS HAVE GAINED AND MAINTAINED A PRO-US

ORIENTATION. FOR THE MOST PART, HOWEVER, THESE MEN ARE NOW SENIOR OFFICERS. RELATIVELY FEW JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE ATTENDED OR WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND CONUS SCHOOLS UNDER CURRENT IMET FUNDING LEVELS. IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, THESE  
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OFFICERS WILL OCCUPY INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS BUT WILL BE VOID OF THE PRO-US SENTIMENT NOW FELT BY MANY SENIOR OFFICERS.

2.F. GOB HAS PURCHASED MILITARY ARMS AND MATERIEL FROM THIRD COUNTRY SUPPLIERS IN THE PAST. WE EXPECT THAT THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE.

TO THIS POINT, THIS TREND HAS NOT BEEN DRIVEN BY THE ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, BUT HAS BEEN CAUSED BY GOB BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS WHICH HAVE LED THE MILITARY TO PLACE A PREMIUM ON PRICE, AVAILABILITY AND TERMS AS OPPOSED TO THE QUALITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE DESIRED EQUIPMENT. GOB HAS PREFERRED TO BUY READILY AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT AT LOWER PRICES EVEN THOUGH IT RECOGNIZES THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS INFERIOR TO THAT PRODUCED IN THE US. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHERE DESIRED EQUIPMENT OF PROVEN QUALITY AND RELIABILITY IS REASONABLY AVAILABLE FROM US COMMERCIAL SOURCES, GOB HAS OPTED TO PURCHASE FROM THE US. PURCHASES OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND LIGHT AND MEDIUM TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ARE RECENT CASES IN POINT.

THE PURCHASE OF ESSENTIALLY NON-MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE US AFFECTS THE RELATIONSHIPS WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY (ARMY ENGINEER AND MILITARY AIR TRANSPORTATION). SOME TIES ACCRUE FROM SUCH PURCHASES IN THAT WORKING RELATIONSHIPS ARE CREATED WITH US COMMERCIAL FIRMS. HOWEVER, THE INFLUENCE OF ARMS PURCHASES IS MUCH MORE PRONOUNCED, ESPECIALLY UPON THE YOUNGER EMERGING OFFICERS. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT MORE TIES AND INFLUENCE ARE CREATED WITH ANY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THROUGH ARMS THAN THROUGH NON-MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

THE ARMS TRANSFER POLICY AND THE RECENT LEGISLATION  
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WHICH PRECIPITOUSLY REDUCED THE SIZE, CAPABILITIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION IN BOLIVIA, HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION OF US MILITARY DISINTEREST AND WITHDRAWAL. THESE FACTORS, TOGETHER WITH THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF THIRD COUNTRIES TO MARKET

ARMS WILL ACCELERATE THE TREND.  
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**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
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**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
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**Reference:** 77 STATE 306726  
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**Review Content Flags:**  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014